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What Can Social Capital Tell Us About Planning 
Under Localism?
Abstract: Local government and the planning system in England are set 
to be significantly overhauled with the passage of the Localism Act, 
which received Royal Assent on 15th November 2011. The localism 
agenda sees a new enhanced role for community participation but this 
raises a number of key questions: Who will get involved? Will the Act 
foster NIMBYism? How far can the localism agenda engender action 
toward implementation?  Using the concept of social capital we examine 
these questions and outline what the key dilemmas may be for localist 
planning, in the process assessing the value of the social capital concept 
for such an analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2010, the first coalition government in the UK since the Second 
World War took power following a closely fought election.  Comprising a 
majority Conservative Party partner and a minority Liberal Democrat 
partner, the coalition sought to negotiate an agreement so that 
governing and power could occur.  One area of common ground 
between the two parties was a dislike of ‘big government’ and a 
commitment to community empowerment.  For the Liberal Democrats it 
can be argued that this is core to their ideology and can be traced back 
to the 19th century; for the Conservatives, while an anti-state position 
can also be seen as fundamental doctrine, the association with 
community empowerment is arguably more recent, arising from the 
Prime Minster, David Cameron’s espousal of a ‘Big Society’ agenda 
(Cameron, 19 July 2010).  Some critics have seen this as a cloak for 
rolling back the state and reducing welfare services to the bare 
minimum (Taylor-Gooby & Stoker, 2011).  However, Conservative 
spokespersons have continued to present it as a positive new agenda 
that deftly removes what they see as cumbersome state regulation 
whilst simultaneously engendering a sense of community spirit (Pattie 
and Johnson, 2011). 
For the planning system in England, the impact of the new agenda is 
being felt in the form of localism, a decentralisation of the state to the 
community or neighbourhood scale, given statutory expression in the 
Localism Act 2011. While presented as a reform or amelioration of a 
flawed planning system, this is yet another example of central 
government seeking to reshape the landscape of governance (Morphet, 
2005).  This raises interesting questions about how this new governance 
landscape will impact on public engagement with planning problematic, 
the capacity for a strategic vision for an area, and the implementation of 
plans in the face of power.  This paper addressed such questions and 
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assesses the value of the social capital concept as a framework of 
analysis.  First it fleshes out the localism agenda before outlining the 
key elements of the social capital concept.  It then goes on to consider 
how localism will impact on planning using the social capital concept 
and, finally, it concludes on the analysis of localist planning and the 
value of such a social capital analysis. 
THE LOCALISM AGENDA AND PLANNING
While the Localism Act makes a range of changes to the role of local 
government, for the planning system the key elements are the creation 
of Neighbourhood Development Plans (referred to colloquially on the 
DCLG website – and here – as Neighbourhood plans or NPs) and 
Neighbourhood Development Orders (NDOs).  In the Act NP are to be 
created by either Parish Councils or (where these do not exist) 
Neighbourhood Forums (NFs) and approved via a referendum passed by 
a simple majority of voting residents. NFs themselves have to be 
approved by the local authority and comprise at least 21 people. This is 
potentially a significant decentralising of planning powers and 
responsibilities in England.  Operating in the context of the Local 
Development Frameworks (already being prepared by local government 
under the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004) and National 
Planning Policy (established by central government1), NPs will set out 
how communities would like to see their areas develop over time.  NPs 
are complemented by NDOs, which would amend the development 
control regime for the local area by permitting certain approved 
developments without the need for separate applications to the Local 
Planning Authority for planning consent.  This is an extension of the 
provision for extended permitted development rights under the Local 
Development Orders regime instituted by the 2004 legislation; however, 
that was a discretionary system under the control of local authorities, 
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1 See www.communities.gov.uk/planningandbuilding/planningsystem/planningpolicy/
whereas this is a community-led approach.  NDOs will be subject to an 
independent examination and formally adopted by the local authority. 
Significantly, the 2011 Budget statement (predicated on the HM 
Treasury report The Plan for Growth) made two key changes to the 
original proposals for neighbourhood planning.  Firstly, the right to 
create NPs and NDOs has been extended to businesses, which can now 
play a leading role in the creation of these plans and orders.  Secondly, 
the Treasury has firmly stated that NPs can be used to “...shape 
development, but not to block it”, thereby embedding a ‘pro-growth’ 
vision of planning into the process (Treasury, 2011b: 1.82-2.16).  This 
has been given expression in the new draft National Planning Policy 
Framework or NPPF (DCLG, 2011a) which controversially contains a 
presumption in favour of sustainable development.  The Ministerial 
forward makes it clear that “Development means growth” and 
“Sustainable” is very broadly interpreted to mean “ensuring that better 
lives for ourselves that don’t mean worse lives for future generations”.  
Later the NPPF clearly states “without growth, a sustainable future 
cannot be achieved” (S. 13). 
Since the Localism Act is thus firmly aligned with a pro-growth agenda, 
ways of encouraging local communities to permit new development are 
also included.  The New Homes Bonus is a financial incentive that will 
accrue per unit of development, and be available for investment in 
community facilities.  This supplements the Community Infrastructure 
Levy, which predates the localism reforms and provides for local 
authorities to set a levy on new development to fund identified 
infrastructure requirements in the local area (under the Planning Act 
2008).  The idea is to avoid new development being a financial (or 
otherwise) burden on the local area and instead see it as funding 
desired facilities.  Greg Clark, Minister for Communities and Local 
Government, in the Report stages of the Bill, stated that it was important 
for the community to “see the cake grow” so that they “recognise that 
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development is not against their interest but contributes to a better 
community for them” (HoC, 2011: 33).   
Both the Localism Act and Budget statement are grounded in a discourse 
prominently based on the belief that the current system of planning 
curtails growth and is overly bureaucratic (Treasury 2011: 1.26).  This 
narrative of a lethargic, market-hampering planning system in need of 
overhaul has been repeatedly and periodically expressed by central 
government from the Thatcher government, through the Major regime 
to New Labour (Thornley, 1993; Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2000).  
What is novel is the attempt to combine this with decentralisation of 
plan-making and associated permitting of development.  For such a 
narrative has tended to support greater centralised control rather than 
the passing of such control to localities.  The abolition of the Regional 
Spatial Strategies (including their indicative housing targets) by the 
Localism Act would seem to cement the down-scaling of planning.  
However, this is not the complete story. 
There remain a range of planning measures which retain central control 
(particularly over significant developments) and, perhaps, further embed 
a sense of hybridity in the system, potentially producing tensions 
between central control on the one hand and increasing participation on 
the other (Raco et al, 2006; Brownill, 2009).  Firstly, the appeal regime 
continues to be a key element of the planning system whereby 
developments that are refused permission may be considered and 
decided upon by the Planning Inspectorate – a central government 
agency.  It remains to be seen to what extent the Inspectorate will 
permit development that has been refused because it does not comply 
with a Neighbourhood Plan.  Secondly, central government policy as set 
out in National Planning Policy (including the NPPF) remains significant – 
particularly in planning appeal decision-making where Inspectors are 
required to give it weight in making their decisions and 
recommendations.  Finally, a separate regime now exists for major or 
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nationally significant infrastructure projects (set up under the Planning 
Act 2008), streamlining the planning permission process through the 
involvement of a dedicated unit of Commissioners (originally forming 
the Infrastructure Planning Commission but now absorbed into the 
Planning Inspectorate as the Major Infrastructure Planning Unit).  They 
work to guidance in the form of National Policy Statements, issued by 
central government and agreed by Parliament; the final decision on the 
project has been transferred to the Secretary of State (from the 
Commissioners) under the Localism Act. 
Thus, these new reforms would appear to reinforce a form of localism 
that exists in the shadow of centralism (Brownill & Carpenter, 2009) 
where the “tools of metagovernance remain with the centre” (Barnett, 
2011: 287).  Nevertheless, the localism agenda sees a new and 
enhanced role for local communities in planning their areas and this 
raises a number of key issues that deserve exploration.  The first 
concerns the question of who is likely to get involved in localist 
planning.  The second addresses the criticism that localism is likely to 
foster NIMBYism and prevent issues of the broader ‘collective good’ 
being considered.  Finally, the extent to which localism will alter power 
dynamics and engender action towards implementation of community-
generated plans must be questioned.  There are sound reasons to 
suggest that the concept of social capital may be useful in assessing 
these questions, as the next section outlines. 
THE USES OF THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
Over the past 20 years there has been a clear and sustained interest in 
social capital that has impacted on both academic and policy 
communities.  Whilst some have considered it to be a “chaotic” concept 
(Healey et al, 1999), a great deal of effort has gone into clarifying and 
strengthening it through both finding methods to measure its 
endowments (Lin and Fu, 2001; Putnam, 2001), and also in further 
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subdividing the concept into different types or forms to better facilitate 
analysis (Putnam, 2000; Woolcock, 2001; Rydin and Holman, 2004).  
Central to all definitions of social capital is the understanding that 
networks imbued with trust, norms and values can operate to impact on 
numerous problems including community cohesion and broader 
collective action. 
There have been two broad uses of the social capital concept relevant to 
planning.  Firstly, academics have used it to help better explain 
community engagement and activism.  This has been based on the 
identification of bonding social capital within communities (see Portes 
and Landolt, 1996; Woolcock, 1998; Rydin and Holman, 2004).  Bonding 
social capital is typified by strong links, homogenous actors, common 
norms particularly of trust, but also reciprocity and mutuality.  It is often 
thought of as the ‘glue’ that binds groups together.  Friendship and 
kinship networks would well-describe bonding social capital, but one 
must always be cognisant of the fact that these networks may be forces 
for social good and mutual support or they may harbour negative 
properties that create suspicious and inward looking groups that form 
factions (Vervisch, 2011).  Nevertheless social capital has been lauded 
for fostering a sense of community identity and leading to community 
activism.  It particularly fosters participation by community members 
through the exercise of ‘soft sanctions’ of blame for non-participation 
and the creation of positive solidarity benefits from interacting with 
other members of the community (Chong, 1991; Magnani and Struffi, 
2009). 
Secondly, social capital has been used in policy contexts to analyse the 
governance of policy formulation and implementation.  This has 
involved attention to networks of heterogeneous actors and the 
identification of the benefits of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) more 
typical of stakeholder engagement in consultation and other policy 
exercises.  This has been captured in a number of variants of the social 
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capital concept.  Bridging social capital is used to describe weak 
horizontal ties between heterogeneous groups of actors who may 
nevertheless share some common norms.  If bonding capital is the 
‘glue’ that binds groups together, Putnam has described bridging capital 
as a sort of “sociological WD40” (2000: 19) that enables diverse groups 
to ‘get along’ and allow communities to create more outwardly oriented 
networks (Elliot et al, 2010).  Again, antisocial outcomes have 
sometimes been tied to bridging social capital with the case of drug 
cartels in Columbia cited as a prime example (Vervisch, 2011).  Linking 
social capital is a subset of bridging social capital with ties between 
heterogeneous groups, but this time scaled upwards and ‘linked’ to 
actors with power or resources.  Woolcock (2000) describes this type of 
social capital as performing the work of getting connected groups ahead 
by providing them with access to key actors at a higher tier.  Here again, 
Vervisch (2011) also warns us that ‘unresponsive’ or ‘exploitative’ 
linking capital can also have its ‘dark sides’ by blocking other important 
developments in the network.  Finally, bracing social capital has been 
used to describe a combination of bridging and bonding social capital 
but with more attention paid to network form and the combination of 
weak and strong ties that define that form.  Bracing capital is not simply 
a group level attribute; it also helps us to identify hubs within networks, 
and therefore network manager who can be important for 
operationalising connections across the network and facilitating policy 
work (Rydin & Holman, 2004; Rydin & Falleth, 2006). 
Planning under localism brings together community engagement and 
policy work in a ways that suggests that both these dimensions of social 
capital will be relevant.  Thus it is apposite to consider how far the 
concept of social capital can help us understand the potential of localist 
planning.  We consider this under the heading of three key questions for 
those interested in how localist planning will work. 
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WILL PEOPLE ENGAGE WITH LOCALIST PLANNING? 
One of the major problems that the planning system has faced over the 
years is generating sufficient, meaningful and constructive participation 
in plan-making and planning decision-making from among local 
communities.  The ‘affectedness principle’ suggests that all those 
individuals affected by an issue should be involved in its determination 
(Barnett, 2011: 281), and various methods have been used to try and 
engender this engagement.  These have ranged from the more usual 
publicity campaigns and consultation exercises, through to innovative 
deliberative measures such as citizens’ juries, deliberative panels and 
charrettes (Sanoff, 2000; Andrews et al, 2008). However, while the more 
innovative measures seem to deliver a higher quality of engagement 
they are resource intensive and, by definition, can only involve a smaller 
number of people.  Furthermore, all these methods have difficulty in 
reaching a wider range of community representatives beyond the ‘usual 
suspects’.  This has led some critics to point out that “how ‘publics’ are 
constituted within planning and within consultation exercises has been 
shown to be itself exclusionary” (Brownill, 2009: 366).  The reforms 
being made under the localism umbrella need to be cognisant of these 
criticisms if they are to truly deliver a new participatory form of planning 
system.
One of the key aims, therefore, of localist planning will be to break the 
collective action problem that constrains participation (Rydin & 
Pennington, 2000) and engage a much wider cross-section of the local 
population in the in-depth and detailed work of creating NPs.  The 
collective action problem refers to the way that for many people, the 
current and certain costs of participating in planning outweigh the 
uncertain and future benefits, as seen from the point of view of 
community members.  It further points to the tendency for people to 
free-ride on the participation of others on the basis of a judgement that 
their own personal contribution is unlikely to make much discernible 
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difference and therefore the time investment associated with 
participation is not commensurate with its rewards.  The social capital 
literature suggests that building social capital can help resolve this 
collective action problem. 
The key idea is that building social capital within a local community (or 
mix of communities) will create links between people that are imbued 
with certain key norms. It is these norms that build commitment and 
encourage people to reframe their incentive structure so as to 
participate in an activity that otherwise would fall foul of the collective 
action problem.  People will participate if they feel they have a mutual 
interest in doing so and that there will be reciprocal benefits 
forthcoming from their making the commitment to participate (Holman, 
2007, 2008).  In addition, trust between those involved in a localist 
planning exercise will cement the commitment further.  Should this be 
insufficient to produce significant participation, the wider networks of 
social capital will then create the opportunity for the soft sanctions of 
blame and shame to be exercised, stigmatising those who fail to join in 
(Chong, 1991: Magnani and Struffi, 2009).
The question is whether the shift towards localism will also shift 
attitudes to participation.  Planning under localism presents itself as 
planning by local communities for local communities.  As noted by 
Shona Dunn, Director of Planning at the Department of Communities 
and Local Government, the Localism Act, alongside other reforms to the 
planning system, aims to change both the mindsets and the behaviours 
of communities with respect to planning, persuading them that they 
may directly influence their locale (RTPI 2011).  As such, she is 
suggesting that the chances of participation at the community level 
having an impact on the plans drawn up, and the planning decisions 
made, is much greater under localism.  The perception of such an 
impact could itself alter the scale and nature of participation. 
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The social capital concept would suggest that, where close bonds exist 
within a community, the embedding of the notion that control within the 
planning system is now vested in local communities could alter the 
incentive structure for participation and lead to significantly more 
involvement (Stoker, 2004).  And those who readily see the value of 
engaging in neighbourhood planning exercises may then pressure 
others, also, to become involved.  Thus, building bonding social capital 
and creating the conditions for successful neighbourhood planning (in 
terms of participation) go hand in hand.  Where such bonding social 
capital is present, it will be easier to generate more participation; and, 
furthermore, successful localist planning is likely to generate more 
bonding social capital, creating a virtuous cycle.  However, it should be 
noted that whilst this type of collectivity can emerge, it generally does 
so over time, and some would suggest that it does so best within a clear 
organisational framework that allows participation to be generated 
slowly through a reflexive process rather than suddenly through the 
creation of a new regime (Haus & Klausen, 2011).
However, as alluded to above, while this picture is attractive, there are 
likely to be pitfalls.  Much of its success depends on people being 
convinced of the importance of their role within neighbourhood 
planning exercises.  Lay-folk may not care sufficiently about the impacts 
of planning policy to get involved; there are more important things in 
their daily lives.  The ‘promises’ of localist planning may not be believed 
sufficiently to outweigh the costs in terms of effort, disturbance to 
routines, and childcare and transport costs that accompany 
participation; communities may not trust government to leave the future 
of their locality in their hands.  The role given to business within 
neighbourhood planning, the threats from centrally-sanctioned 
infrastructure development, and the presumption in favour of growth 
may all result in the incentive structure remaining firmly weighted 
against participation.  In addition, the work involved in localist planning 
is quite considerable, more than attendance at previous planning 
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consultation exercises.  Thus the impact of the promise of control has to 
be seen against the greater burden of participation that localism 
envisages. 
A further issue is that the idea of a virtuous cycle within localist 
planning depends on the notion of strong bonding social capital within 
local communities, and this in turn generally assumes relatively 
homogeneous communities.  However, communities are usually diverse 
and bonding links typically connect sub-groups within the broader local 
population rather than tie all that population together equally.  For 
localism to work, it will therefore be necessary to build linkages – 
bridging social capital – across these diverse groups and, more 
problematically, to imbue them with common norms.  On its own, 
bonding social capital can entrench insular pockets of community 
activism.  Therefore, it needs to be accompanied by bridging social 
capital to further solidify and enforce community linkages across 
networks.
One key way to build both bridging and bonding social capital is to 
identify a ‘common threat’ that affects all local groups within the 
community (Pennington and Rydin, 2000).  As McClymont and O’Hare 
(2008) found when studying two such cases, the threat of unwanted 
development can result in stronger community ties and significant 
activity as disparate groups come together to protect ‘their community’.  
Yet creating a network within a community that is strongly connected 
and highly active to generate plans and manage development will be 
much more difficult.  Much will depend on how substantial the perceived 
benefits generated from the development are, and how those benefits 
are to be distributed across local households.  If the incentive to 
participate broadly across a community is to be maintained, those 
benefits will have to be shared broadly as well. 
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WILL PLANNING PROBLEMS BE FRAMED IN PURELY LOCAL TERMS?
The main criticism that has been levelled at the localist planning agenda 
thus far is that it will foster NIMBYism: that is, neighbourhood-scale 
planning will embed an ‘anti-development’ bias within the planning 
system (and we have indicated above how this may go hand-in-hand 
with closely bonded local communities based on threats from ‘outside’).  
Understood from a social capital perspective, this is about the ‘dark-
side’ of the concept (Portes and Landolt, 1996).  It particularly refers to 
the potential for bonding social capital to create such a dense set of 
local network ties that the community becomes cut off from the 
influence of outside perspectives. 
From a planning perspective this would mean that only local, 
neighbourhood concerns get taken into account, potentially rendering 
the interests of individuals, groups or organisations outside the network 
as automatically illegitimate regardless of whether there is any merit in 
meeting their requirements.  This could mean that meeting the needs of 
businesses for premises, or new households for accommodation, is 
more difficult to achieve.  It could also mean that developments that 
meet a broader public interest might be resisted – including the classic 
‘LULUs’ (or Locally Unwanted Land Uses) such as waste treatment 
facilities.  An excellent example of this is provided by Aldrich and Crook 
(2008) discussing the siting of mobile homes in neighbourhoods in the 
aftermath of hurricane Katrina.  Rather than strong bonding social 
capital resulting in networks of social support, this very ‘social good’ 
had negative outcomes in that these organisations concomitantly helped 
to block the siting of unwanted relief housing in their neighbourhoods.  
Aldrich (2008) further found that measures of low civil society activity in 
Japan were the best predictors of positive siting decisions for nuclear 
power plants, airports and dams.  What both these cases illustrate is 
that areas with stronger levels of social capital are better able to resist 
and sometimes deflect unwanted land uses. 
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Currently the proposed system is relying on the financial inducement of 
the New Homes Bonus and the current tools of S106 agreements and CIL 
to deliver benefits from new development that will encourage local 
communities to incorporate such development into their NPs.  It will 
however require a degree of skill – presumably arising from the 
professional support from local authority or private sector planners to 
local communities (perhaps funded by wealthier residents or business 
interests) – to produce a plan that generates sufficient benefits to 
convince those communities of the benefits of growth or intensification 
or new non-residential land uses.  Currently the skills of place-making 
and of negotiating amendments to planning applications are attuned to 
balancing local concerns with a broader perspective on desirable change 
in the locality, and both occur within the broader structure set by the 
Local Development Framework.  The new system provides a financial 
driver for residential growth in an attempt to overcome the potential 
NIMBYist tendencies of a strongly bonded local community actively 
involved in neighbourhood planning but fails to consider the broader 
planning task involved in spatially structuring land uses and the location 
of new development. 
Co-ordination across development plans in multiple neighbourhoods or 
at different scales could also be undermined by excessively localist 
tendencies fostered by strongly bonded local communities.  The danger 
of fostering bonding and even bridging social capital within local 
communities in the pursuit of localist planning is that it will be at the 
expense of bridging ties outside that community and linking ties to 
organisations at a greater scale or covering a wider territory.  What is 
needed to ensure that these non-local interests are taken into account 
is that the networks of actors involved in planning include ties outwards 
to representatives of heterogeneous and non-local actors.  Thus, a 
mechanism needs to be created whereby those engaged in 
neighbourhood planning encounter actors that speak for other interests 
in order to debate and recognise the legitimacy of those interests.  While 
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it might be expected that local communities may not recognise the 
interests of every business or household that wishes to locate in their 
area, debate within the localist planning arena might at least confront 
the community with the needs of non-locals and, in particular, the 
consequences of not providing for key facilities that serve the broader 
society.
At present, localist planning will have to rely on the new ‘duty to co-
operate’ set out in S.110 of the Localism Act to achieve this bigger 
picture and, in particular, to ensure co-ordination of neighbourhood 
plans with other plans in other localities and at other scales.   In short, 
the ‘duty to co-operate’ “...will ensure that local authorities and other 
public bodies are involved in a continual process of active engagement 
to maximise the effectiveness of working on strategic planning issues 
and the preparation of local plans.” (DCLG, 2011b).  However, as 
currently written, the duty does not appear to direct neighbourhood 
forums or parish councils to interact with one another.  Rather the local 
authority is left with the duty to co-ordinate the multiplicity of 
neighbourhood plans in their area, but without any apparent means of 
doing so given that the power and responsibility of neighbourhood 
planning is vested on more local forums. Generating vital bridging and 
linking social capital amongst and between communities and 
organisations that share boundaries and territories could be an 
important way to generate some co-ordination under localism. 
WILL ANYTHING HAPPEN AFTER PLANS ARE DRAWN UP? 
To be effective, the new planning regime must not just draw up plans, 
but also deliver them.  Failures of implementation could, themselves, be 
a significant barrier to building up community involvement in the 
planning exercise itself (as explained above).  Studies into parish plans 
and town plans, upon which some feel this new system was developed, 
suggest that residents are far more likely to engage with topics like 
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traffic calming, litter and other ‘quality of life’ issues than they are to 
tackle more abstract land-use planning problems (Bishop, 2010).  In 
part, this is due to the fact that topics like litter abatement and traffic 
calming are ‘action-and results-oriented’, where residents can readily 
see the results of their participation and evaluate its effectiveness.  
However, the outcome of participatory efforts and the eventual 
implementation of NPs raises key issues regarding power and resources, 
upon which there has been much recent scholarship (Ross & Osborne, 
1999; Sullivan, 2005; Taylor et al 2005; Sinclair, 2011). 
There is nothing in the new system of NPs that makes planning more 
proactive and action oriented in terms of bringing land and development 
forward to achieve plan outcomes; nor does it seek to address power 
imbalances that may occur in neighbourhood planning exercises.  For 
change to occur, communities still must rely on sufficient investment by 
developers, companies or agencies to be implemented. Therefore, not 
only do the networks of local communities need to be considered in 
terms of ‘how’ their social capital is built up and nurtured over time.  
But also, we need to understand the nature and longevity of networks 
and social capital developed between local authorities, business 
organisations and developers, as these linkages could impede the 
progress of community-led planning. 
The lens of social capital is useful in shedding light on a number of 
aspects of power and implementation within the localist planning frame.  
For example, the works of Sullivan (2005), Taylor et al (2005) and 
Sinclair (2011) all point to the real difficulties voluntary organisations 
found in community planning due to power imbalances.  Firstly, Sullivan 
(2005) noted that despite an often real desire on the part of the local 
authority to involve voluntary organisations in planning, implementation 
and decision making, local authorities found that they did not 
necessarily require the input of these groups to operate effectively.  
Both Taylor et al (2005) looking at voluntary and community 
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organisations in England, and Sinclair (2011) examining Community 
Planning Partnerships in Scotland, have also shown that these groups 
are simply not given the same weight and value in partnerships as are 
businesses and formal public sector partners. 
The reason for this would appear to be that the resources that 
community groups ‘bring to the table’ in terms of plan preparation and 
implementation are small when compared to their business and public 
sector colleagues’ resources for achieving urban change. Those 
voluntary and community groups that do get valued tend to be those 
that “...have something to trade”, be that good quality evidence for the 
policy process; novel policy ideas; or help in delivering and 
implementing policy locally (especially engaging ‘hard-to-reach’ 
groups) (Taylor et al, 2011: 7).  Here, again, we see a role for bonding 
social capital, where groups have built up over time around a common 
interest and therefore have either local specialist knowledge (this 
especially holds true for environmental groups - Taylor et al, 2005) or 
networks that allow for access to groups not normally reached by local 
government.  
Linking social capital networks are also particularly important because 
they involve resource flows into and out-of local communities.  For 
example, as businesses have now been invited into the process of 
creating NPs, situations could occur where the bridging and linking 
capital between businesses and local authorities is strengthened by 
localist planning, shaping local policy agendas and development 
outcomes.  This might ‘trump’ any strong ties formed between and 
within local community groups.  In such a situation, a strong community 
perspective on neighbourhood planning may not prevent the agenda 
being dominated by economic development interests.  Indeed, the 
presumption in favour of sustainable development already sets a 
structural condition by strengthening the ties of developers within their 
networks compared to those of communities. 
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The Community Infrastructure Levy and the New Homes Bonus are in the 
established tradition of planning gain, allowing some local benefits to 
be funded through taking a share of development profit or development 
land gains (as discussed above).  However, they are not means of 
implementation of complete NPs in themselves.  The Localism Act does 
make provision for community assets to be designated in a list, with a 
view to providing a 6 month pause to any proposed disposal and giving 
the local community a change to bid for an asset.  This is largely with a 
view to preserving their role in supporting community services; however, 
the latter mechanism does raise the possibility of communities adding 
the power of landownership to that of strong network ties.  While 
community assets, themselves, may play only a marginal part in making 
communities more able to implement their neighbourhood plans, the 
‘community right to build’ may be important, as it will provide a 
mechanism for community groups (such as community interest 
companies or Community Development Trusts) to own and develop land 
as a collective enterprise.  The community right to build is effectively a 
special form of NDO specifically permitted community development.  
This follows in the spirit of the original Garden Cities movement 
(although on a much smaller scale). Here the landownership resource 
may imbue community networks with much more implementation 
power.  But it will not do so on its own; creating such an organisation 
will, of necessity, open up community networks to engagement with a 
wider range of actors in order to deliver the desired development 
outcome. 
From a social capital perspective, to achieve implementation of their 
plans the community needs to situate itself within networks that go 
outside the tight community ties of bonding social capital.  The ties that 
need to be built here are rather specific and oriented towards bringing 
the necessary resources into the enterprise to deliver the desired 
investment (see also Stone, 1989 and Holman, 2007 on network power).  
The bracing social capital concept describes this mix of strong and weak 
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bonds, bringing some clusters of homogeneous actors (as within the 
local community) together but also connecting them to heterogeneous 
actors outside the community (development expertise, finance sources, 
etc.) in a very targeted way.  The network and mix of actors and ties 
needs to be tailored according to the needs of the development activity 
and mobilise norms of mutuality (in pursuit of a common development 
enterprise), reciprocity (to release and apply all the necessary resources: 
financial, organisational and political) and trust (to ensure the smooth 
working of the network over the time-scale of the development activity). 
CONCLUDING ON THE VALUE OF THE SOCIAL CAPITAL CONCEPT IN 
UNDERSTAND LOCALIST PLANNING
The Localism Act seeks to engender a new enthusiasm and appetite for 
planning at the neighbourhood level.  Whilst this is arguably a noble 
aim, and certainly something that planners have been trying to achieve 
since the Skeffington Report of 1969, there are a number of issues that 
have to be considered.  We have outlined these using the lens of social 
capital to help us understand how these dilemmas may play out under 
the new system.  Considering the combination of network ties with the 
norms operating through the network sheds a new light on how the 
planning reforms might work and the difficulties they might encounter. 
The first issue concerns engendering participation beyond the usual 
suspects, and breaking the collective action problem.  Here we have 
demonstrated how the building of networks based on shared norms 
could encourage participatory action that might not otherwise have 
taken place.  In terms of social capital this relies on a delicate balance of 
bonding and bridging capital to create norms of participation across a 
diverse community.  However, we have also underscored that the 
emphasis on a pro-growth agenda and the elements of control that 
remain outside the local community may undermine the ability of such 
social capital to build participation, since the underlying promise of 
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neighbourhood planning to deliver what local communities want for 
their area may not be believed and may not off-set the considerable 
effort involved in neighbourhood planning. 
Secondly, we tackled the issue of NIMBYism illustrating how too much 
bonding social capital can cause communities to look inwards and fail to 
consider more strategic and cross-boundary issues.  The formal duty to 
co-operate (written into the Act) that requires various neighbourhoods 
to come together to examine important strategic issues may be 
insufficient.  What is needed is a mechanism that encourages networks 
of bridging links to overcome the inherent tendency of localism to 
produce inward-oriented plans at the community scale. 
Finally, the question of action needs to be asked of the localism agenda.  
Whilst there are elements contained within the Act that would allow for 
the community to purchase local assets, there is little to help them to 
realise their plans since these require outside investment over which the 
community has little control.  What local action for neighbourhood plans 
will require is the generation of linking social capital and carefully 
designed bracing capital networks, bringing together key actors with 
key resources to achieve implementation, perhaps within institutions 
such as Community Development Trusts. 
Localist planning could work provided that bonding and bridging capital 
is fostered to deliver participation, and the mutual ties within a 
community are not undermined by the threat of a dominant pro-
development agenda.  Such planning could take a broader perspective, 
considering the needs of communities in neighbouring locations and at 
broader scales if networks of bridging ties are developed.  And plans 
could result in changes on the ground in line with community wishes if 
attention is directed to the specific combination of bracing and linking 
ties that are needed to deliver the resources and commitment needed 
for implementation. 
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In making this analysis of the prospects and challenges for localist 
planning, we have sought to test out the value of the social capital 
concept to understanding such changes in the landscape of local 
governance.  We contend that this has demonstrated the considerable 
value of such an analysis.  We have attempted to emphasise the 
importance of the networks that local communities are part of, and the 
norms and resources embedded in those networks.  The varieties of 
social capital that the literature identifies are useful in nuancing the 
analysis and highlight different aspects of the ties that local 
communities have internally and externally.  And the emphasis on 
relationships within networks is useful in identifying the dynamics of 
community involvement and non-involvement in planning exercises. 
However, there are some limitations to the concept that are also brought 
out by our analysis.  First, it is difficult sometime to distance social 
capital from the very normative use made of it, particularly within the 
practitioner literature, where it is almost always seen as a positive 
feature of communities.  It is important to retain a neutral stance on the 
building of social capital to allow its analytic potential to be 
demonstrated.  Second, while the concept of linking social capital 
explicitly covers connections across scale, there is much in the dynamics 
of multi-level governance that is not captured in the concept and that 
deserves attention; this includes organisational and institutional 
arrangements across tiers of government, the embedded nature of 
certain policy discourses at different levels and the flow of resources 
across tiers, levels and territories.  Generally one might argue that the 
social capital concept, while it can engage with issues of resources and 
power, does not itself fully incorporate them.  This is a limitation as our 
discussion of planning in the face of power to achieve change on the 
ground shows.  Social capital analysis operates at a micro, if not pico 
level and thus needs to be embedded in a broader institutional analysis 
for the full picture. 
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Finally, it should be recognised that such networks are not static.  The 
concept of social capital, by using a ‘stock’ metaphor, can suggest that 
some communities have more and others less social capital ‘in the 
community bank’.  And indeed, a focus on networks can emphasise this 
by providing a snapshot of relationships within a community or locality 
at a point in time.  However it is important to recognise that such 
networks are dynamic.  The social capital – of whatever kind – inherent 
within a network can be created or destroyed; can atrophy or grow.  This 
means that there is scope to ‘shape’ networks in order to deliver more 
effective planning (see Holman, 2008).  We have identified above how 
networks should be shaped in order to deliver effective localist planning. 
Currently the rhetoric of localism is in danger of delivering only failed 
promises and thwarted desires for local communities.  However, 
planners could regain a key role under the new agenda by focussing on 
how they could actively build the networks and specific forms of social 
capital needed in order achieve participation, frame localist planning in 
broader terms by injecting much needed planning skills into the 
neighbourhood planning exercise, and deliver development that meets 
community needs and wishes by actively considering the necessary 
resources and engaging with those who have the power to deliver such 
change. 
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